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JEL Classification:  D40, D80, L50 
  






Chair of Organization and Management 




E-mail: kosfeld@econ.uni-frankfurt.de   
 
                                                 
* We would like to thank Johan Almenberg, Roland Benabou and seminar participants at the 2010 AEA 
meeting, Atlanta, the 2010 Econometric Society World Congress, Shanghai, the 2010 EARIE meeting, 
Istanbul, and the 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik meeting, Kiel, for helpful comments. 1 Introduction
If consumers are naive, ﬁrms will try to exploit it. Well-known examples are travelers
who book a hotel room without thinking about the extra costs of add-ons such as
parking or minibar, consumers who buy a printer without being aware of the costs of
new printer cartridges, or bank customers who open a new deposit without consid-
ering the fees of oﬀered investment funds. As shown by Gabaix and Laibson (2006)
(henceforth GL), the equilibrium pricing strategy of ﬁrms in such situations may be
to compete purely on the price of the base good (i.e., the hotel room, printer, or
deposit) and to shroud any information about the price of the add-on (i.e., the mini-
bar, printer cartridges, or investment funds). While the base good is priced below
marginal costs the price of the add-on is above marginal costs. The consequences
for consumers are twofold: First, sophisticated consumers who rationally expect that
add-ons are overpriced will search for substitution possibilities leading to ineﬃciency
if costs of substitution for the add-on exceed a ﬁrm’s costs of production. For exam-
ple, travelers may carry their own drinks, reﬁll cartridges themselves, or build their
own investment portfolios. Second, naive consumers who buy the add-on at the high
price subsidize the low-priced base good and thereby sophisticated consumers, which
raises consumer protection concerns. The question is if and how a regulator may
intervene to increase economic welfare and to help and protect consumers in their
decision making.
This paper analyzes the welfare eﬀects of a simple and popular form of regulatory
intervention: consumer education.1 Such education may come, for example, in the
form of consumer protection campaigns that teach naive consumers to be aware of
high-priced add-ons. It may also include “warning labels” that inform buyers about
the possibility of shrouded product attributes. Intuition suggest that if such education
comes at low costs and works, i.e., if consumers learn and become more sophisticated
in their decision making, regulatory intervention will have only positive eﬀects on
consumer protection and welfare. In contrast, our results show that the eﬀects can
1For example, the OECD, US, EU and UK launched several ﬁnancial education initiatives over
the last years. The OECD states that “ﬁnancial education is necessary to ensure suﬃcient levels of
investor and consumer protection as well as the smooth functioning, not only of ﬁnancial markets,
but also of the economy.” (OECD, 2009, p. 3).
1actually be negative. Education entails hidden welfare costs that may render such
intervention unfavorable. The reason is that education directly aﬀects the behavior of
some naive consumers but at the same time via the pricing strategy of ﬁrms indirectly
also the outcomes of all other consumers. Whereas the ﬁrst group is typically better
oﬀ, our results show that the second group is typically worse oﬀ. If the costs of
the latter outweigh the beneﬁts of the former, educating naive consumers decreases
economic welfare.
Our analysis is based on the model of GL; we extend their set-up, however, in two
important ways. First, we assume that a regulator can educate a fraction of naive
consumers before ﬁrms decide upon their pricing strategy. Second, besides shrouding
the add-on or unshrouding, we allow ﬁrms to engage in partial unshrouding, which
implies a particular form of price discrimination. The reason for considering price
discrimination in our model is that it itself can increase market eﬃciency, in which
case an intervention of the regulator may not be needed. Further, as we will see,
there exist important interaction eﬀects between regulatory intervention and price
discrimination.
By price discrimination we consider the idea that ﬁrms may have information
about consumers that correlates with consumers’ sophistication in making decisions.
For example, consumers with a degree in economics or ﬁnance are likely to make more
sophisticated and better informed investment decisions than consumers who have no
such educational background. Banks may use this information to classify consumers
as either naive or sophisticated and ﬁne-tune their product oﬀers accordingly. How-
ever, the classiﬁcation of consumers is unlikely to be perfect. We hence allow for the
possibility that ﬁrms erroneously classify a naive consumer as sophisticated or vice
versa.
Our results show that price discrimination is a symmetric equilibrium if and only
if ﬁrms classify consumers suﬃciently well and the share of naive consumers is in-
termediate. Firms shroud the add-on price if there are many naive consumers and
unshroud prices if the fraction of naive consumers is low. As intuition suggests, price
discrimination increases welfare relatively to a shrouded prices equilibrium. However,
it decreases welfare relatively to an unshrouded prices equilibrium. Since markets
2may remain ineﬃcient and some consumers continue to pay high prices, regulatory
intervention remains on the agenda.
If the regulator intervenes by educating consumers, the share of sophisticated con-
sumers increases by some positive fraction. Firms react to this by adjusting prices to a
new equilibrium. We show that economic welfare increases if the rise in sophisticated
consumers is suﬃciently large such that ﬁrms unshroud prices in the new equilibrium.
In all other cases welfare eﬀects are or can be negative. Ex-ante naive consumers who
become educated always beneﬁt from the intervention as they make better consump-
tion decisions. However, naive consumers who remain naive as well as sophisticated
consumers typically lose. Since these consumers are unable to improve their decision
about the add-on, the change in consumption costs in their case depends on the price
of the base good which, as a consequence of the intervention, increases.
The main message of our paper is that education which is good for the single
consumer may be bad for the group of consumers as a whole. Due to a feedback
on prices educating some consumers may entail hidden costs for other consumers,
leading to increased prices and a reduction in overall welfare. Education is welfare
improving, however, if suﬃciently many naive consumers react. Unfortunately, evi-
dence suggests that chances do not look very bright with this respect. Choi, Laibson
and Madrian (2010), for example, show in an investment experiment with high mone-
tary incentives that more than 80 percent of the participants fail to take into account
the, in part, substantial fees of investment products even when these fees are made
transparent and salient.2 In the light of these results, regulators are advised to take
into account that the success of educating naive consumers is likely to be moderate
to low. Consequently, intervention may be harmful and a regulator’s courses of ac-
tion are plagued with pitfalls. For example, increasing the success rate of education
without upsetting the underlying type of market equilibrium can make things worse.
2Other studies show that ﬁnancial counseling or mandatory disclosure do little to improve the
decisions of consumers in the mortgage market (Agarwal et al., 2009; Lacko and Pappalardo, 2010).
Bhattacharya et al. (2011) document that only few retail investors are interested in free and inde-
pendent investment advice, and if they obtain it, hardly follow the advice. Willis (2011) highlights
that eﬀective education would be extremely costly, and suggests that the regulator should explore
other tools to increase household ﬁnancial welfare. For a literature review on ﬁnancial education,
see De Meza, Irlenbusch and Reyniers (2008).
3Likewise, regulatory intervention without knowing whether ﬁrms are able to engage
in price discrimination or not yields eﬀects that go in any direction. In particular,
it may be that educating consumers increases welfare if ﬁrms are able to engage in
price discrimination but decreases welfare if no such possibility exists.
While regulatory intervention by education may thus be unsuitable to improve
welfare and consumer protection, we brieﬂy discuss three alternatives for the reg-
ulator. These alternative interventions are based on direct subsidies to consumers
or ﬁrms, promoting particular consumer or information and pricing behavior, respec-
tively. Our results show that direct subsidies to consumers have zero eﬀect on welfare,
but subsidizing ﬁrms can actually be eﬀective. On the one hand, the regulator can
subsidizes ﬁrms that unshroud and sell the add-on at a low price to all consumers,
which prevents that sophisticated consumers substitute away and improves welfare.
On the other hand, the regulator can subsidize ﬁrms that sell the add-on to sophis-
ticated consumers only. In particular, subsidized ﬁrms advertise the add-on at an
exceptionally low price and the base good at an above market price, such that sophis-
ticated consumers buy at subsidized ﬁrms and naive consumers (who only consider
the base good price) buy at other ﬁrms.3 While both strategies achieve the same
welfare improvement, they diﬀer in the required volume of subsidies. The former
strategy requires lower subsidies if and only if the share of naive consumers is not too
large. The discussion shows that subsidizing ﬁrms can be a good alternative strategy
for improving welfare, but similar to the case of consumer education, the choice of the
optimal strategy depends on a good understanding of consumer and ﬁrm behavior.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature analyzing the role of consumer
bounded rationality in industrial organization. The literature shows that consumers’
bounded rationality can lead to enhanced exploitation of consumers and create an
ineﬃciency, which is also well documented empirically for a large variety of markets.4
In light of the 2007-2008 ﬁnancial crisis, especially the mortgage market and the
3Note that restricting subsidies to ﬁrms that serve naive consumers only is impossible as sophis-
ticated consumers will always be attracted by the subsidized pricing policy.
4For an overview on bounded rationality and industrial organization, see Ellison (2006) and
Spiegler (2011). As regards the interaction between competition and consumer policy, see also
Armstrong (2008). For an overview on empirical studies in several ﬁelds of the literature, see
DellaVigna (2009).
4retail investment market got a lot of attention from policymakers and researchers.
Several studies show that some borrowers’ poor understanding of the mortgage market
leads to excessive charges and ineﬃciency (see, e.g., Agarwal et al., 2009; Woodward
and Hall, 2010). Further, less well educated individual investors are more likely to
make investment mistakes (Calvet, Campbell and Sodini, 2009). Retail investors pay,
on average, an 8 percent premium for popular structured equity products relative
to the fair market value of these securities (Henderson and Pearson, 2011). Carlin
(2009) argues that ﬁrms in retail ﬁnancial markets may add complexity to their price
structures in order to prevent that consumers become informed and purchase the
product at a lower price.
Studies that explore if regulatory intervention can ﬁx market frictions due to
consumers’ bounded rationality come to mixed results.5 Regulatory intervention via
educating consumers or creating transparency is largely uncontroversial (see, e.g.,
Jolls and Sunstein, 2006). However, recent research also points to potential neg-
ative eﬀects. For example, Kamenica, Mullainathan and Thaler (2011) show that
prices can increase when consumers make better decisions for themselves. In their
model, the consumer loss from higher prices exactly oﬀsets the consumer gain from
better decisions, leaving economic welfare unchanged. Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010)
analyze the case of regulating misleading advertising, which may exist in the form
of shrouded add-ons. They show that misinformation may be a good thing for wel-
fare if oligopoly pricing leads to underconsumption of a product and misinforma-
tion increases consumption. Then, regulatory intervention by educating consumers
(“counter-advertising”) or other forms of regulatory intervention can have negative
welfare eﬀects.
Our analysis diﬀers in several aspects. In particular, diﬀerent from Kamenica,
Mullainathan and Thaler (2011), in our model, better decisions by consumers involve
costly substitution behavior if ﬁrms decide to shroud add-on prices. Thus, welfare
is not constant but depends on the behavior of consumers and ﬁrms. In contrast to
5For example, Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009) show that consumer protection policies such
as price caps have possibly undesirable eﬀects if it leads to a weakening of competitive pressures.
Spiegler (2006a,b) analyzes markets where consumers cannot observe the price or quality of a product
and suggests that there can be a role for regulation to create transparency.
5Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010), misinformation in our model leads to a decrease rather
than to an increase in consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main model. Section
3 calculates market equilibria with and without regulatory intervention. Section 4
contains the main results regarding economic welfare and consumer costs. Section 5
brieﬂy discusses alternatives strategies for regulatory intervention. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 Model
Our model follows the one of GL. There is ﬁnite number of ﬁrms that produce a
homogeneous base good and add-on, both at zero marginal cost. The add-on is always
avoidable for informed consumers, in contrast to unavoidable surcharges which are not
considered in our model. The mass of consumers is normalized to 1. Consumers are
of two types: A fraction α 2 (0,1) of consumers are naive (myopic, in the language
of GL), they only take the price of the base good into consideration when deciding to
purchase a good. The remaining fraction 1   α are sophisticated and consider both
the price of the base good and the price of the add-on. In case ﬁrms do not advertise
the add-on, sophisticated consumers form Bayesian posteriors about the add-on price.
Let p denote the price of the base good and ˆ p the price of the add-on. We focus
on symmetric price equilibria throughout the paper and hence omit ﬁrm-subscripts
whenever doing so causes no confusion. As in GL, ﬁrms decide to shroud or unshroud
add-on prices when consumers make a buying decision about the base good. Both
activities are free. Shrouding means that a ﬁrms suppresses information about the
price of the add-on. Unshrouding means that ﬁrms advertise the price of the add-
on broadly. If a ﬁrm unshrouds, all sophisticated consumers as well as a fraction
λF 2 [0,1) of naive consumers become informed about the price of the add-on and
take it into account when purchasing the good. The latter group of informed naive
consumers is the result of the educational eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s unshrouding activity.
These consumers are initially naive but behave just like sophisticated consumers once
a ﬁrm unshrouds. The remaining fraction 1 λF of naive consumers do not take the
6add-on price into consideration even when ﬁrms unshroud. This group of uninformed
naive consumers is either not receptive or not able to use the relevant information.
Consumers have a maximum willingness to pay for the add-on ¯ p, which sets an
upper bound for the price ˆ p, i.e., ˆ p  ¯ p. In addition, consumers who are informed
about or expect high add-on prices, can avoid the add-on by substituting away at
cost e < ¯ p. Hence, ﬁrms can charge a maximum add-on price ¯ p from uninformed
naive consumers and e from sophisticated and informed naive consumers.
The ﬁrst innovation in our model is that, in addition to always (un)shrouding add-
on prices, ﬁrms can make special oﬀers to consumers who they classify as naive or
sophisticated. This strategy results in a particular form of price discrimination. We
assume that ﬁrms can use available personal information such as education, employ-
ment, etc. to classify consumers. Firms unshroud add-on prices towards consumers
whom they classify as sophisticated because they assume that these consumers oth-
erwise form Bayesian posteriors about the add-on price and substitute away. The
advertised add-on price for these consumers, ˆ pS, cannot exceed e, the substitution
costs of sophisticated consumers. Furthermore, ﬁrms shroud information towards
consumers classiﬁed as naive. The add-on price for these consumers, ˆ pN, is at most
¯ p, the reservation price of uninformed naive consumers.
To illustrate, consider the following example. Banks oﬀer a deposit of securities
as a base good and diﬀerent investment funds as an add-on. Suppose banks know the
educational background of their costumers and use this information to classify them
as naive or sophisticated consumers. They can then advertise an investment fund
with low annual fees, e.g. an exchange-traded fund (ETF), only to consumers with a
degree in ﬁnance. All other consumers are oﬀered actively managed investment funds
with high annual fees.
We allow for the possibility that ﬁrms make mistakes when classifying consumers.
With probability 1   β, ﬁrms erroneously classify a sophisticated consumer as naive.
Further, with probability 1 γ, ﬁrms erroneously classify a naive consumer as sophis-
ticated. Intuitively, β,γ 2 [0,1] model the accuracy of ﬁrms’ consumer classiﬁcation.
The closer these parameter are to 1, the better ﬁrms can identify a consumer’s true
type. As long as β and γ are strictly below 1, misclassiﬁcation implies that ﬁrms un-
7shroud the low add-on price ˆ pS towards a non-zero fraction of naive consumers while
a non-zero fraction of sophisticated consumers will not receive the low-price oﬀer. In
equilibrium, the latter group will therefore substitute away because they expect high
prices while the former group will earn a rent.6
Considering our example, we assume that a fraction 1 γ of naive consumers have
a degree in ﬁnance and are hence erroneously classiﬁed as sophisticated. These naive
consumers then proﬁt from the misclassiﬁcation because they are oﬀered the ETF
with low annual fees, although they would have bought the more expensive, actively
managed fund, as well. Further, a fraction 1   β of sophisticated consumers do not
have a ﬁnance degree and are therefore erroneously classiﬁed as naive. These con-
sumers build their own diversiﬁed portfolio (i.e., substitute away) at cost e, because
they do not get any information about the low-priced add-on and expect that the
bank oﬀers an actively managed fund with high annual fees.
The second innovation in our model is that we allow for regulatory intervention.
Before ﬁrms decide on their information and pricing strategy, we assume that the
regulator can educate a fraction λR 2 [0,1) of naive consumers about the relevance
of add-on prices. Such intervention increases the share of informed consumers in the
population prior to any potential educational eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s unshrouding strategy
from 1 α to 1 (1 λR)α.7 To abstract from implementation costs we assume that
educating consumers is free.
Following GL we analyze price competition by modeling the demand at ﬁrm i
as the probability D(xi) that a consumer purchases a product at that ﬁrm. The
probability depends on xi, which denotes the anticipated net surplus from purchasing
at ﬁrm i less the anticipated net surplus from purchasing at the best alternative ﬁrm.
Formally, the demand function can be derived from a random-utility model, where
individual a consuming product i has utility Uai = v pi+εai, with v and pi denoting
the quality and the price of the product, respectively, and εai denoting a random
6Below we show that a necessary condition for price discrimination to be an equilibrium is that
 > 1   .
7For simplicity, we assume that the educational eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s unshrouding strategy and reg-
ulatory intervention are independent, i.e., F is unaﬀected by the regulator’s decision to educate.
8idiosyncratic preference component that is i.i.d. across consumers and products.8
Since ﬁrms sell homogenous goods, the anticipated net surplus of uninformed naive
consumers who do not take the add-on price into consideration equals
xi =  pi + p
,
where pi and p denote the price of the base good at ﬁrm i and the price of the base
good at the best alternative ﬁrm, respectively. For a sophisticated (and an informed
naive) consumer, who takes both the price of the base good and the price of the
add-on into account, anticipated net surplus equals
xi =  pi   minfEˆ pi,eg + p
 + minfEˆ p
,eg,
where Eˆ pi and Eˆ p represent the expected add-on price at ﬁrm i and the expected
add-on price at the best alternative ﬁrm, respectively. If information is unshrouded,
Eˆ pi = ˆ pi and Eˆ p = ˆ p.
The timing of decisions in our model is as follows:
Period 0
– The regulator decides whether to educate a fraction λR of naive consumers
about the relevance of add-ons.
Period 1
– Firms choose their information and pricing strategy.
 In case of shrouding, ﬁrms suppress information about the add-on.
They pick a price for the base good, p, and a price for the add-on, ˆ p.
 In case of unshrouding, ﬁrms advertise the add-on price towards all
consumers. Unshrouding makes sophisticated consumers and a frac-
tion λF of naive consumers aware of the add-on price. Firms also pick
prices p and ˆ p.
8We refer to GL, p. 532-533 for details. See also Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) for a
general introduction into discrete choice models of price competition.
9 In case of price discrimination, ﬁrms shroud add-on prices towards
consumers classiﬁed as naive and unshroud add-on prices towards con-
sumers classiﬁed as sophisticated. Firms pick a price for the base good,
p, and prices for the add-on, ˆ pN and ˆ pS, for consumers classiﬁed as
naive and sophisticated, respectively.
Period 2
– Informed consumers (sophisticated and informed naive) always take the
price of the add-on into consideration. Sophisticated consumers who do
not receive any information about the add-on (because ﬁrms shroud or
they are erroneously classiﬁed as naive), form Bayesian posteriors about
the add-on price.
– Uninformed naive consumers do not consider the add-on for their buying
decision.
– Consumers choose a ﬁrm.
– Informed consumers can decide to substitute away at cost e.9
Period 3
– Consumers observe the add-on price (if they have not done so already).
– All consumers buy the base good.
– Uninformed consumers buy the add-on if the price is at most their reser-
vation price ¯ p.
– Informed consumers buy the add-on if they have not already substituted
away in period 2.
3 Price equilibria
We ﬁrst analyze symmetric price equilibria without regulatory intervention. GL show
that there exist two symmetric equilibria in their set-up: a shrouded prices and an
9Like GL we assume that substitution costs occur prior to the purchase of the base good.
10unshrouded prices equilibrium. The existence of these equilibria depends on the share
of naive consumers in the population, the substitution costs and the upper bound for
the add-on price. If the share of naive consumers is relatively large, i.e. α > e
 p, the
shrouded prices equilibrium exists. If there are relatively few naive consumers, i.e.
α < e
 p, the unshrouded prices equilibrium exists. We extend their result by showing
that ﬁrms’ possibility to classify consumers as naive or sophisticated changes the
thresholds above, and that price discrimination can become a third equilibrium if
the share of naive consumers is intermediate.



















eβ + (¯ p   e)(1   γ)
)
. (2)
If α < αy, there exists a symmetric equilibrium, in which ﬁrms unshroud the add-on
price and set ˆ p = e (unshrouded prices equilibrium). If αy < α < αz, there exists
a symmetric equilibrium, in which ﬁrms engage in price discrimination with ˆ pS = e
and ˆ pN = ¯ p (price discrimination equilibrium). If αz < α, there exists a symmetric
equilibrium, in which ﬁrms shroud the add-on price and set ˆ p = ¯ p (shrouded prices
equilibrium).
All proofs are in the appendix.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. If the share of naive consumers is small
(α < αy), it is optimal to sell the add-on to every consumer. As sophisticated
consumers substitute away if they observe (or expect) add-on prices larger than
e, ﬁrms optimally set a price ˆ p = e and unshroud. From the ﬁrst-order condition
(p + ˆ p =
D(0)
D′(0) = µ) it follows that the price of the base good is equal to µ   e in the
unshrouded prices equilibrium.
If the share of naive consumers is intermediate (αy < α < αz), price discrimination
is an equilibrium strategy. A necessary condition is that αy < αz, which holds if and
only if β > 1   γ, i.e., errors from misclassiﬁcation are small. Firms choose the
110 1
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Figure 1: Price Equilibria Without Regulatory Intervention
highest possible add-on price ˆ pN = ¯ p as a standard, which they shroud, and make
special oﬀers ˆ pS = e to consumers who they classify as sophisticated. If β < 1,
some sophisticated consumers are misclassiﬁed and do not receive the special oﬀer.
These consumers see that ﬁrms shroud, conclude that Eˆ p = ¯ p and hence substitute
away. Firms accept this as the share of naive consumers is suﬃciently large such
that it pays to shroud the high add-on price. On the other hand, if γ < 1, there are
some naive consumers who buy the add-on at a price ˆ pS = e that is strictly below
their reservation price ¯ p. Firms accept this as well, as the share of naive consumers
is not large enough for it to pay to ignore sophisticated consumers and shroud the
add-on completely. Note that price discrimination yields higher revenue for ﬁrms
on the add-on. However, competition on the base-good market forces ﬁrms to pass
this extra revenue to consumers in the form of lower base-good prices. In the price
discrimination equilibrium, the price of the base good is therefore lower than in the
unshrouded prices equilibrium. From the ﬁrst-order condition we see that it is equal
to µ   αγ¯ p   e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β).
Finally, a shrouded prices equilibrium exists, if the share of naive consumers is
large (α > αz). In this case, ﬁrms sell the add-on at the highest possible price ˆ p = ¯ p
to naive consumers only. Information is shrouded because unshrouding decreases
the fraction of uninformed consumers. Sophisticated consumers observe that ﬁrms
shroud, rationally expect that Eˆ p = ¯ p and hence substitute away. Again, all extra
revenue on the add-on is competed away on the base-good market, leading to a price
for the base good equal to µ   α¯ p.
Table 1 summarizes prices, consumer costs and welfare for the diﬀerent price
equilibria.
12Table 1: Prices, Consumer Costs and Welfare
Uninformed Informed Informed Uninformed
Unshrouded prices Naive Naive Sophisticated Sophisticated
Base good    e
Add-on e e e
Substitution
Share of consumers (1   F) F 1   
Welfare loss 0
Uninformed Informed Informed Uninformed
Price discrimination Naive Naive Sophisticated Sophisticated
Base good    ¯ p   e((1   ) + (1   ))
Add-on ¯ p e e e
Substitution e
Share of consumers  (1   F)(1   ) F(1   ) (1   ) (1   )(1   )
Welfare loss (1   )(1   )e
Uninformed Informed Informed Uninformed
Shrouded prices Naive Naive Sophisticated Sophisticated
Base good    ¯ p
Add-on ¯ p
Substitution e
Share of consumers  1   
Welfare loss (1   )e
As already mentioned, a necessary condition for price discrimination to be an
equilibrium is that the interval [αy,αz] exists, which is equivalent to β > 1   γ. If
this condition is not fulﬁlled, Proposition 1 is equivalent to the main result in GL, as
the following Corollary 1 summarizes.
Corollary 1 (No Price Discrimination, Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). Suppose that
β  1   γ. This implies that ay = αz = e
 p. There exist an unshrouded prices
equilibrium if α < e
 p and a shrouded prices equilibrium if α > e
 p.
On the other hand, if errors are relatively small and sophisticated consumers
can be classiﬁed perfectly (1   γ < β = 1), price discrimination always dominates
unshrouding. In consequence, the unshrouded prices equilibrium no longer exists.
13Corollary 2 (No Unshrouding). Suppose that 1 γ < β = 1. This implies that αy = 0
and αz = e
e+( p e)(1 γ). There exist a price discrimination equilibrium if α < αz and a
shrouded prices equilibrium if α > αz.
Similarly, if errors are small and uninformed naive consumers can be classiﬁed
perfectly (1   β < γ = 1), price discrimination dominates shrouding. Thus, the
shrouded prices equilibrium no longer exists.
Corollary 3 (No Shrouding). Suppose that 1   β < γ = 1. This implies that αy =
e(1 β)
e(1 β)+( p e) and αz = 1. There only exist a unshrouded prices equilibrium if α < αy
and a price discrimination equilibrium if α > αy.
Together Corollary 2 and 3 imply that if both consumer types are classiﬁed per-
fectly (β = γ = 1), neither shrouding nor unshrouding can be equilibrium, and only
the price discrimination equilibrium remains.10
Suppose now that the regulator decides to educate naive consumers about the
relevance of potentially high add-on prices. Formally, this implies that a fraction λR 2
[0,1) of ex-ante naive consumers become sophisticated, i.e., the share of sophisticated
consumers rises from 1   α to 1   (1   λR)α. The eﬀect on price equilibria of this
intervention is that equilibrium thresholds speciﬁed in Proposition 1 shift to the right.
Proposition 2 (Price Equilibria With Regulatory Intervention). Suppose the reg-
ulator intervenes by increasing the share of sophisticated consumers by λRα. Let
αx = 1
1 λRαy and α♯ = 1
1 λRαz. An unshrouded prices equilibrium exists if α < αx, a
price discrimination equilibrium exists if αx < α < α♯, and a shrouded prices equilib-
rium exists if α♯ < α.
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀect of regulatory intervention on equilibrium thresholds
and corresponding equilibrium intervals. Generally, both the area where ﬁrms un-
shroud prices and the area where ﬁrms price discriminate in equilibrium increases,
10There exists a non-empty interval to the right of y, in which both the price discrimination and
the unshrouded prices equilibrium co-exist. A similar interval exists to the right of z, in which
the price discrimination and the shrouded prices equilibrium co-exist. The size of these intervals
depend on F (see the proof of Proposition 1 for details). Since the multiplicity of equilibria is not
immediately relevant for the results in our model, we do not consider this issue any further in the
following.
14whereas the area, in which ﬁrms shroud prices becomes smaller. The size of the
right shift depends on λR. The more naive consumers are aﬀected by the regulation
the greater is the eﬀect on ﬁrms’ equilibrium behavior and corresponding market
outcomes.
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Figure 2: Price Equilibria With (And Without) Regulatory Intervention
In the next section, we analyze in detail the impact of regulatory intervention
on equilibrium prices and economic welfare. The analysis follows an equilibrium
approach, i.e., we assume that ﬁrms in the market adjust to the new equilibrium after
intervention and compare market outcomes to those that would realize in equilibrium
if the regulator did not intervene.
4 Welfare eﬀects and consumer costs
There are two potential reasons why the regulator may decide to intervene in the given
market. The ﬁrst reason is that market outcomes may be ineﬃcient, because some
consumers — the sophisticated — exert costly eﬀort to substitute add-ons that can
costlessly be produced by ﬁrms. This ineﬃciency arises whenever ﬁrms shroud the
add-on or price discriminate but do not reach all sophisticated consumers. Economic
welfare is fully captured by consumer costs in our model because ﬁrm equilibrium
proﬁt is constant. In particular, as ﬁrms produce at zero marginal cost, ﬁrm proﬁt
per consumer is determined by the average total price of the base good and the add-
on. In equilibrium, this price is determined by the demand function D and is equal
to µ =
D(0)
D′(0) in any equilibrium.
The second reason for intervention is that some consumers — the naive — pay
too much for the add-on and thus serve as a cash cow which subsidizes low base
15good prices for sophisticated consumers. Again, this may happen when ﬁrms either
shroud the add-on or choose (imperfect) price discrimination. Note that total costs of
consumption of an ex-ante naive consumer depend on whether the consumer becomes
informed about add-ons or stays uninformed as ﬁrms (partially) unshroud or the
regulator educates, respectively. We interpret the fraction of naive consumers who
become informed as the probability for an ex-ante naive consumer to become informed
and calculate expected costs of consumption of an ex-ante naive consumer.
As a reference point for the analysis, consider the extreme cases that all consumers
are sophisticated or all consumers are naive. In the ﬁrst case, the proﬁt maximizing
pricing strategy of ﬁrms is to compete on both the price of the base good and the
price of the add-on. The bundle of both products will be oﬀered at cost-reﬂective
prices to all consumers who have no incentive to substitute away. In the second case,
the proﬁt maximizing pricing strategy of ﬁrms is to compete purely on the price of
the base good and to charge the reservation price of consumers for the add-on. Again,
the bundle of both products will be oﬀered at cost-reﬂective prices to all consumers
because the ﬁrms’ proﬁts from high add-on prices get competed away on the base
good. Such a price equilibrium represent the so-called loss-leader pricing (Lal and
Matutes, 1994). Thus, the consumer harm is limited to the ineﬃciency caused by
the departure of prices from costs on a product-by-product basis, e.g., consumers
may replace the base good too early. It is generally argued that this welfare loss is
relatively small. In sum, both the situation where all consumers are sophisticated
and the situation where all consumers are naive generally do not require regulatory
intervention. Welfare and consumer protection issues arise because consumer are
heterogenous.
We begin the analysis by summarizing the eﬀect of price discrimination on welfare,
i.e., we calculate and compare the realized welfare loss with and without the possibility
for ﬁrms to price discriminate.
Proposition 3 (Welfare Eﬀects of Price Discrimination). Price discrimination strictly
increases economic welfare relative to a shrouded prices equilibrium (e
 p < α < αz)
and weakly decreases economic welfare relative to an unshrouded prices equilibrium
(αy < α < e
 p).
16In terms of welfare, price discrimination represents a clear improvement relative
to a shrouded prices equilibrium, because less sophisticated consumers substitute
away as they get informed about the low-priced add-on. The better ﬁrms can target
sophisticated consumers, the lower is the fraction of consumers substituting away and
thus the higher is economic welfare. If consumer classiﬁcation is perfect (β = 1), the
welfare loss is zero, just as in the unshrouded prices equilibrium. If β < 1, however,
price discrimination decreases welfare in the case where ﬁrms would unshroud prices
otherwise. The eﬃciency rationale for regulatory intervention then remains.
As the next proposition shows, although price discrimination can be favorable in
terms of eﬃciency, not all consumers always gain when ﬁrms have the possibility to
price discriminate.
Proposition 4 (Eﬀects of Price Discrimination on Consumer Costs). Sophisticated
consumers always gain from price discrimination, i.e., their costs of consumption
are strictly lower than in a corresponding shrouded or unshrouded prices equilibrium
(αy < α < αz). Expected costs of ex-ante naive consumers decrease relative to a
shrouded prices equilibrium (e
 p < α < αz) but increase relative to an unshrouded
prices equilibrium (αy < α < e
 p). Misclassiﬁed naive consumers always gain from
price discrimination; however, those who are classiﬁed correctly face higher costs of
consumption when ﬁrms price discriminate compared to an unshrouded prices equi-
librium but lower compared to a shrouded prices equilibrium.
Propositions 3 and 4 are illustrated in Figure 3 (a) and (b), which documents
the loss in welfare and the costs of consumption in the diﬀerent price equilibria for
a particular combination of parameters. In this example, ﬁrms are in an unshrouded
prices equilibrium for α < αy = 0.1 and in a shrouded prices equilibrium for α >
αz = 0.37. Without price discrimination, these regions expand until they meet at
α = e/¯ p = 0.2. If price discrimination is possible and optimal, it replaces the other
two equilibria for 0.1 < α < 0.37. Figure 3 (a) shows that price discrimination
(dashed line) decreases the loss in welfare relative to a shrouded prices equilibrium
(0.2 < α < 0.37) but increases the loss in welfare relative to an unshrouded prices
equilibrium (0.1 < α < 0.2). Figure 3 (b) reveals that naive consumers who are
17classiﬁed correctly (upper dashed line) are the ones who potentially lose from price
discrimination. They pay the high add-on price ¯ p whenever α > 0.1. For 0.1 <
α < 0.2 this is much more than they would pay in an otherwise unshrouded prices
equilibrium. For 0.2 < α < 0.37 they beneﬁt because the base good price is lower
compared to the otherwise shrouded prices equilibrium due to more add-on sales
to sophisticated consumers. Notably, the same consequences hold in expectation
for all naive consumers (middle dashed line). Only those naive consumers who are
misclassiﬁed by ﬁrms as well as sophisticated consumers (lower dashed line) gain from
price discrimination.
(a) Welfare (b) Consumer Costs
Note: Parameters are ¯ p = 1;e = 0:2; =  = 0:7, and  = 0. Resulting
equilibrium thresholds are y = 3=31;e=¯ p = 0:2, and z = 7=19.
Figure 3: Welfare Eﬀects of Price Discrimination
We next come to the welfare eﬀects of regulatory intervention. As explained
above, intervention is unnecessary if ﬁrms are in an unshrouded prices equilibrium.
The main question is therefore, what eﬀects does regulatory intervention have when
ﬁrms are in a shrouded or in a price discrimination equilibrium. As the following
proposition shows, increasing consumer sophistication can be beneﬁcial but it may
also do more harm than good to economic welfare.
Proposition 5 (Welfare Eﬀects of Regulatory Intervention). Regulatory intervention
has no eﬀect on welfare if ﬁrms are in an unshrouded prices equilibrium before inter-
vention (α < αy). It has a clear positive eﬀect on welfare only if ﬁrms are pushed
18into an unshrouded prices equilibrium after intervention (αy < α < αx). In all other
cases, welfare eﬀects are or can be negative. In particular, eﬀects are either posi-
tive or negative if ﬁrms are pushed from shrouded prices towards price discrimination
(αz < α < α♯). They are always negative if a shrouded prices equilibrium (α♯ < α)
or a price discrimination equilibrium (αx < α < αz) remains.
Proposition 5 is illustrated in Figure 4 (a), which considers the same example as
Figure 3. The solid line in panel (a) shows the welfare loss before regulatory interven-
tion in an unshrouded prices equilibrium (α < 0.1), a price discrimination equilibrium
(0.1 < α < 0.37) and a shrouded prices equilibrium (α > 0.37), respectively. The
dashed line indicates the welfare loss in the new equilibrium situation after regu-
latory intervention with equilibrium thresholds equal to αx = 0.16 and α♯ = 0.61.
The diﬀerence between the two lines is the net eﬀect on welfare due to regulatory
intervention. As can be seen, there are two areas, in which the eﬀect is positive be-
cause the welfare loss is smaller after intervention than before. These are the area
0.1 < α < 0.16, where ﬁrms are pushed from price discrimination to unshrouded
prices, and 0.37 < α < 0.61, where ﬁrms are in an shrouded prices equilibrium be-
fore intervention and choose price discrimination thereafter.11 In all other cases, the
welfare eﬀect is either zero (α < 0.1) or negative (0.16 < α < 0.37 or α > 0.61). In
the ﬁrst case, ﬁrms unshroud the add-on price independent of whether the regulator
intervenes or not. In the second and in the third case, ﬁrms adjust prices but the
underlying equilibrium strategy — price discrimination and shrouded prices, respec-
tively — remains. Because a key element of these strategies is that a fraction of or
all sophisticated consumers substitute away, the eﬀect on welfare is negative as more
consumers become sophisticated due to the regulatory intervention. In other words,
regulation may well be successful on an individual level, as it induces some consumers
to make individually better decisions — they no longer buy the expensive add-on.
However, as long as ﬁrms’ pricing strategies induce these consumers to substitute
away and thus behave ineﬃciently, regulation may fail on a social level — economic
11Note that regulatory intervention may push ﬁrms directly from a shrouded prices equilibrium
to an unshrouded prices equilibrium, either if a price discrimination equilibrium does not exist or if
R is suﬃciently large such that z < 1
1 λRy.
19welfare decreases.
(a) Welfare (b) Consumer Costs
Note: Parameters are ¯ p = 1;e = 0:2; =  = 0:7; = 0, and
R = 0:4. Resulting equilibrium thresholds are y = 3=31;x =
5=31;e=¯ p = 0:2;z = 7=19 and ♯ = 35=57.
Figure 4: Welfare Eﬀects of Regulatory Intervention
In this example, regulation has a positive eﬀect on welfare if ﬁrms are pushed from
shrouded prices to price discrimination. Unfortunately, this result does not hold in
general. In the proof of Proposition 5 we show that the eﬀect is negative whenever
the error probability in classifying sophisticated consumers 1   β is relatively high
and/or the educational eﬀect λR is relatively strong. The reason is the following: If
the educational eﬀect is strong, many ex-ante naive consumers become sophisticated
as a result of the regulator’s intervention. Firms adjust to this by switching from
shrouded prices to price discrimination. Sophisticated consumers now buy the add-
on if and only if ﬁrms oﬀer it to them at a low price, otherwise they substitute away.
If ﬁrms target sophisticated consumers very badly, substitution may actually increase
and welfare declines.12
The next proposition spells out the impact of regulatory intervention on consumer
costs. The result shows that the decrease and increase in welfare goes along with
diﬀerent losses and gains for the diﬀerent types of consumers.
12In our model, the error probability 1  is exogenous and not aﬀected by regulatory intervention.
If  is endogenous, it is intuitive that, if anything, regulatory intervention will increase the likelihood
of misclassiﬁcation because the composition of consumer groups has changed. This makes it even
more likely that the welfare eﬀect is negative.
20Proposition 6 (Eﬀects of Regulatory Intervention on Consumer Costs). Regulatory
intervention has zero eﬀect on consumer costs if ﬁrms are in an unshrouded prices
equilibrium before intervention (α < αy). In all other cases, ex-ante naive consumers
who are educated through the intervention win, i.e., they have lower consumption
costs than before regulatory intervention. However, sophisticated consumers and in
most cases also naive consumers who stay naive are on the losing side: their costs of
consumption increase.
Figure 4 (b) illustrates how regulatory intervention aﬀects consumer costs, as
stated in Proposition 6. The same thresholds as in Figure 4 (a) apply. First, consider
the solid lines that show consumer costs without regulatory intervention for sophis-
ticated (lower line) and naive consumers (upper line).13 Second, consider the dashed
lines that show consumer costs with regulatory intervention. The upper line shows
the costs for consumers who are immune to education, i.e., who are naive ex ante
and remain naive also if the regulator intervenes. The lower line shows consumption
costs for sophisticated consumers and for ex-ante naive consumers who are educated
through the intervention. The middle line shows expected costs of ex-ante naive con-
sumers. The eﬀect of regulatory intervention is given by the diﬀerence between the
dashed and solid lines for the diﬀerent types of consumers.
As the Figure illustrates, consumption costs are unaﬀected for α < 0.1. If 0.1 <
α < 0.16, costs of naive consumers decrease independent of whether they are actually
educated by the intervention or not, since ﬁrms unshroud prices in the new equilibrium
anyway. For larger α, the eﬀect on costs depends on whether a naive consumer is
educated or not. On the one hand, ex-ante naive consumers who are educated always
have lower consumption costs after regulation (lower dashed line) than before (upper
solid line). Ex-ante naive consumers who remain naive, on the other hand, have higher
costs after regulation (upper dashed line) than before (upper solid line), except if ﬁrms
are pushed from a shrouded prices equilibrium to price discrimination (0.31 < α <
0.61). In this case, they gain from the positive probability of being misclassiﬁed and
thus being oﬀered the low-priced add-on. Sophisticated consumers, however, lose for
13In case of price discrimination, consumption costs for naive consumers depend on whether they
are classiﬁed correctly or misclassiﬁed. The Figure shows expected costs.
21sure: they always face higher consumption costs after regulation (lower dashed line)
than before (lower solid line). Thus, while the intervention decreases the costs of the
target group — ex-ante naive consumers who become educated — it simultaneously
increases the costs of other consumers. Whenever the loss of the latter outweighs the
gain of the former, regulatory intervention generates a negative eﬀect on welfare.
Note that regulatory intervention can even lead to an increase in expected costs of
ex-ante naive consumers alone. This happens in Figure 4 (b) if α > 0.8.14 In this case,
the beneﬁt for the educated naive consumers is already oﬀset by the damage to those
who remain naive. Thus, even a regulator who focuses exclusively on the welfare of
naive consumers and neglects any impact on the sophisticated, should refrain from
intervention in this case.
Our results show that regulatory intervention has a negative eﬀect on welfare if
it increases the degree of consumer sophistication, but the increase is too small to
change the ﬁrms’ equilibrium pricing strategy. One possible course of action the
regulator may consider is to boost the educational impact of his intervention on naive
consumers, i.e., increase λR. While the chances of success of such an attempt seem
rather bleak in the light of the available evidence (Choi, Laibson and Madrian, 2010),
Figure 5 shows that an increase in λR may, in fact, worsen the situation in terms of
welfare.
In this example, we for simplicity assume that β  1   γ, so no price discrimi-
nation equilibrium exists. Further, parameters are chosen such that ﬁrms unshroud
the add-on price if and only if α < 0.2. Starting with an ex-ante share of 70 percent
naive consumers, regulatory intervention thus pushes ﬁrms from shrouded prices to
an unshrouded prices equilibrium if and only if λR > 5/7. In this case, intervention
has a positive eﬀect on welfare as it reduces the welfare loss from 0.06 before the
intervention to zero afterwards. For smaller values of λR, however, regulatory inter-
vention increases the welfare loss up to 0.16, i.e., almost three times as high as the
welfare loss before regulation. This shows that a boost in the educational eﬀect of the
intervention may in principle be a good idea, but only if the boost is strong enough.
Finally, another potential pitfall for the regulator is given by the fact that the
14The general condition is  > maxf1   e
 p;♯g.
22Note: Parameters are ¯ p = 1;e = 0:2; = 0:7;  1   .
Figure 5: Welfare Eﬀects of an Increase in the Educational Impact λR
welfare eﬀect of education critically depends on whether ﬁrms can price discriminate
or not. If the regulator is unable to assess the pricing strategies of ﬁrms correctly,
the welfare impact of regulatory intervention is thus unclear. Figure 6 illustrates
such a situation. Suppose the regulator observes that ﬁrms are in a shrouded prices
equilibrium and estimates the fraction of naive consumers to be α = 0.5. Educating
consumers makes a fraction λR = 0.4 of naive consumers informed. Figure 6 shows
that the welfare eﬀect of education is positive, i.e., the welfare loss decreases, if
ﬁrms can discriminate between sophisticated and naive consumers (left panel) but is
negative, i.e., the welfare loss increases, if ﬁrms are unable to do so (right panel).
5 Alternative strategies for intervention
The results of our analysis reveal that educating naive consumers can be a double-
edged sword and thus the wrong way for regulatory intervention in the context of add-
on pricing. In this section, we analyze direct, tax-funded subsidization of consumers
or ﬁrms as an alternative. We consider three possible such strategies. For simplicity,
we assume that ﬁrms can not engage in price discrimination and that they are in a
shrouded prices equilibrium with corresponding welfare loss (1 α)e before regulatory
intervention.
First, consider a strategy where the regulator subsidizes consumers for buying
23(a) welfare eﬀects with PD (b) welfare eﬀects w/o PD
Note: Parameters are ¯ p = 1;e = 0:2; =  = 0:7; = 0, and R = 0:4. Resulting
equilibrium thresholds are y = 3=31;x = 5=31;e=¯ p = 0:2;z = 7=19 and ♯ = 35=57.
Figure 6: Pitfalls of the Regulator
the add-on. Such subsidy may come, for example, in the form of tax breaks. Let τ
denote the subsidy oﬀered to each consumer. Suppose for a moment that ﬁrms do
not react to such a subsidy. In this case, a direct subsidy of τ = ¯ p   e would induce
all consumers to buy the add-on at price ¯ p. Consumption costs of naive consumers
would fall by τ, while those of sophisticated consumers would be the same as before
(they pay ¯ p   (¯ p   e) = e for the add-on which is equal to their substitution costs
otherwise). Thus, the total reduction in consumer costs equals (¯ p   e)α. Further,
total proﬁt of ﬁrms that now sell the add-on also to sophisticated consumers increases
by ¯ p(1 α). Since the total amount of subsidies is ¯ p e, the strategy seems to increase
social welfare by (¯ p   e)α + ¯ p(1   α)   (¯ p   e) = (1   α)e.
Unfortunately, this scenario is unlikely to hold. Rather, ﬁrms will realize that
consumers receive a subsidy for the add-on and that this increases the reservation
price of naive consumers from ¯ p to ¯ p + τ. In consequence, the price of the add-on
rises to ¯ p + τ, the price of the base good falls by ατ, and sophisticated consumers
substitute away as before. The total reduction in consumer costs is equal to ατ,
which is the same as the total amount of subsidies required. Thus, the direct eﬀect
on welfare is zero. Furthermore, the increase in naive consumers’ reservation price
causes αy to fall, i.e., the area where an unshrouded prices equilibrium exists becomes
smaller making an eﬃcient market outcome even less likely. Subsidizing consumers
24is therefore not a good idea.
Alternatively, the regulator may subsidize ﬁrms for implementing a particular
price strategy. One obvious such possibility is to pay alls ﬁrms a subsidy τ = α¯ p   e
per consumer if they unshroud the add-on and oﬀer it at a price e to any consumers.
Since ﬁrms’ proﬁts stay the same under such strategy — average revenue per consumer
under the new strategy equals p+e+(α¯ p e) = p+α¯ p — ﬁrms are indiﬀerent to this
intervention and hence can be assumed to implement the price strategy. (Otherwise,
the regulator can increase the subsidy marginally by ϵ.) The eﬀect on consumption
costs is that costs of naive consumers decrease by ¯ p   e. Costs of sophisticated
consumers remain unchanged: they buy the add-on at the low price e instead of
substituting away at cost e. Thus, if all ﬁrms follow the desired price strategy, total
costs of consumption decrease by (¯ p   e)α. The required amount of subsidies which
need to be funded by taxes is τ = α¯ p   e, reﬂecting the foregone ﬁrm proﬁts. The
net increase in welfare is (¯ p e)α (α¯ p e) = (1 α)e, i.e., subsidizing ﬁrms in this
way reduces the welfare loss down to zero. Note that the total volume of subsidies
increases in α. The lower the share of naive consumers, the less subsidies are needed.
Educating naive consumers thus decreases the costs of subsidization in this case.15
Finally, the regulator may also consider the following strategy. Suppose that in the
end only ﬁrms that sell the add-on to sophisticated consumers shall receive a subsidy
τ = ¯ p   e. This can be achieved by advertising the add-on at an exceptionally low
price e   ∆ and at the same time charging the base good at an above market price
p + ∆. Such strategy attracts sophisticated consumers, who now buy the add-on,
but does not attract naive consumers. The market is thus split into two segments:
subsidized ﬁrms that serve sophisticated consumers and non-subsidized ﬁrms that
serve naive consumers. All consumers pay their reservation price for the add-on, i.e.,
sophisticated pay e and naive pay ¯ p. Average revenue per consumer is the same for
all ﬁrms (including subsidies), i.e., no ﬁrm has an incentive to switch segments.
To see this, note that the market price of the base good falls by (1   α)¯ p due
an equivalent increase in the average revenue per consumer made on the add-on by
15The intuition is straightforward. On the one hand, ﬁrms lose proﬁt (¯ p e) on naive consumers.
On the other hand, they gain proﬁt (1 )e from sophisticated proﬁts. The net proﬁt forgone ¯ p e
increases in the share of naive consumers.
25non-subsidized ﬁrms. Subsidized ﬁrms sell the base good above that market price
but pass the extra revenue on to their customers by an equivalent reduction in the
price of the add-on. In addition, they receive the subsidy for each consumer. Thus,
average revenue per consumer at a subsidized ﬁrm equals (p+∆)+(e ∆)+(¯ p e)
which is equal to p + ¯ p, the average revenue per consumer at a non-subsidized ﬁrm.
The eﬀect of this intervention is that costs of consumption of all consumers de-
crease by (1   α)¯ p. The total amount of subsidies required is (1   α)(¯ p   e). The
diﬀerence between both represents a net increase in welfare by (1   α)e. Thus as
before, subsidizing ﬁrms in this way reduces the welfare loss down to zero. The
main diﬀerence is that in this case the required volume of subsidies decreases in α,
i.e., costs of subsidization become smaller as the share of naive consumers increases.
Thus, educating naive consumers increases the costs of subsidization in this case.16
The analysis shows that the cost-eﬃcient subsidization of ﬁrms depends on the
share of naive consumers. Oﬀering subsidies to all ﬁrms is superior if and only if the
share of naive consumers is not too large (α <
 p
2 p e). Otherwise, subsidization of
ﬁrms that sell the add-on to sophisticated consumers is better as it requires a lower
volume of tax-funded subsidies. Furthermore, educating naive consumers decreases
the required volume of subsidies in the ﬁrst case but increases subsidies in the second
case. Figure 7 illustrates the situation by showing the reduction in consumer costs and
the required volume of subsidies for the two subsidization strategies. While subsidies
increase in α if all ﬁrms receive subsidies (dotted line), they decrease if subsidies are
restricted to ﬁrms that serve sophisticated consumers only (dashed line).
6 Conclusion
When ﬁrms exploit naive consumers, educating consumers looks like a good idea.
The goal is to teach naive consumers how to make better decisions; this in turn leads
ﬁrms under competitive pressure to lower prices and hence increases welfare. Our re-
sults show that if consumer education is suﬃciently eﬀective such that ﬁrms unshroud
16Again, the intuition is straightforward. On the one hand, ﬁrms lose proﬁt (1   )¯ p on the base
good. On the other hand, they gain proﬁt (1   )e from sophisticated consumers. The net proﬁt
forgone (1   )(¯ p   e) decreases in the share of naive consumers.
26Note: Parameters are ¯ p = 1;e = 0:2,   1 . Resulting equilibrium thresholds are
y = z = 0:2. Without subsidies, a shrouded prices equilibrium with a welfare loss
of (1 )e exists for  > 0:2. Both alternative regulatory strategies, \subsidies to all"
and \subsidies to sophisticated only", yield a consumer cost reduction that is above
the amount of required subsidies, and thus eliminate the welfare loss. \Subsidies to
all" requires lower subsidies if 0:2 <  < 0:55 while the opposite holds for  > 0:55.
Figure 7: Welfare Eﬀects of Alternative Regulatory Strategies
prices, economic welfare indeed increases. However, educating consumers is unlikely
to be always successful because some consumers may be unreceptive to the informa-
tion or simply unwilling to be told by the regulator how to decide (Agarwal et al.,
2009). In this case, educating some consumers may in fact decrease economic welfare.
Our results show that the welfare eﬀects of education critically depend on the overall
fraction of naive consumers, the success of consumer education, the reservation price
for the add-on, substitution costs for sophisticated consumers, and the eﬃciency of
price discrimination. Often, the regulator can only speculate about these things. As
a general message our analysis suggests that regulators are advised to carefully exam-
ine consumer and ﬁrm behavior before using the seemingly harmless intervention of
consumer education. Otherwise, it may be better to refrain from consumer education
and to consider alternative regulatory strategies to enhance welfare.
27Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof uses various arguments and results from GL and
Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991). In particular, the existence of symmetric equilibrium is
guaranteed by Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991). Given the speciﬁcation of demand D(xi),
equilibrium prices are determined by the ﬁrst-order condition p+ ˆ p =
D(0)
D′(0) =: µ. The
latter is equal to the average proﬁt of a ﬁrm per consumer and represents a simple
parametrization of the degree of competition in the industry.
Note that if β  1   γ,αy = αz = e
 p. In this case, Proposition 1 is equivalent to
Proposition 1 in GL (see also Corollary 1). Suppose therefore that β > 1   γ, i.e.,
αy < e
 p < αz.
Case 1: Suppose that α < αy. We show that unshrouding is an equilibrium.
Suppose all ﬁrms except ﬁrm i unshroud. If ﬁrm i unshrouds as well, it optimally
sets ˆ p = e, yielding proﬁt
(p + e)(1   λF)αD( p + p) + (p + e)(1   (1   λF)α)D( p   e + p + e) (3)
= (p + e)D( p + p).
The ﬁrst term of (3) captures the proﬁt ﬁrm i makes from uninformed naive con-
sumers, the second term captures the proﬁt it makes from sophisticated and informed
naive consumers. Solving the ﬁrst-order condition yields a base good price p =  e+µ.
Alternatively, ﬁrm i can decide to shroud the add-on price or engage in price
discrimination. GL show that shrouding is suboptimal if α < e
 p, which holds in our
case since α < αy  e
 p.
We now show that price discrimination does not exceed the proﬁt from unshroud-
ing, either. With price discrimination, ﬁrm i optimally sets prices equal to the maxi-
mum willingness to pay of sophisticated and naive consumers, respectively, i.e., ˆ pS = e
and ˆ pN = ¯ p. Because other ﬁrms unshroud, a fraction λF of naive consumers become
informed and behave just as sophisticated. Accordingly, price discrimination yields
28proﬁt
(p + ¯ p)(1   λF)αγD( p + p)
+pλFαγD( p   e + p + e)
+ (p + e)(1   λF)α(1   γ)D( p + p)
+ (p + e)λFα(1   γ)D( p   e + p + e)
+ (p + e)(1   α)βD( p   e + p + e) (4)
+ p(1   α)(1   β)D( p   e + p + e)
=
(
p + ¯ p(1   λF)αγ + e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β)
)
D( p + p).
The ﬁrst and second term of (4) capture the proﬁt ﬁrm i makes from naive consumers
who are classiﬁed correctly (which happens with ex-ante probability γ). On the one
hand, this includes a fraction 1   λF of uninformed naive consumers who pay the
high add-on price ¯ p. On the other hand, this includes a fraction λF of informed naive
consumers who also get oﬀered the high-priced add-on but substitute away. The
third and fourth term represent the proﬁt from misclassiﬁed naive consumers (which
happens with ex-ante probability 1   γ) that are oﬀered the low add-on price and
hence pay only e. On the one hand, this includes a fraction 1   λF of uninformed
naive consumers; on the other hand, this includes a fraction λF of informed naive
consumers. The ﬁfth term shows proﬁts from sophisticated consumers who are clas-
siﬁed correctly (which happens with ex-ante probability β) and pay e. Finally, the
sixth term captures the proﬁt from misclassiﬁed informed consumers who erroneously
do not receive the low price oﬀer, therefore rationally expect that Eˆ p = ¯ p and hence
substitute away.
Comparing (3) and (4) reveals that unshrouding yields strictly higher proﬁt than
29price discrimination if and only if
e > ¯ p(1   λF)αγ + e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β)
e > ¯ p(1   λF)αγ + eα(1   γ) + eβ   eαβ
e(1   β) > α(¯ p(1   λF)γ + e(1   γ)   eβ)
e(1   β)
e(1   β) + (¯ p(1   λF)   e)γ
> α,







. Thus, unshrouding is an equilibrium.
Case 2: Suppose that α > αz. We show that an equilibrium exists, in which
all ﬁrms shroud the add-on price. Suppose all ﬁrms except ﬁrm i shroud. If ﬁrm i
shrouds as well, it optimally sets ˆ p = ¯ p, yielding proﬁt
(p + ¯ p)αD( p + p) + p(1   α)D( p   e + p + e) (5)
= (p + α¯ p)D( p + p).
The ﬁrst term of (5) captures the proﬁt from naive consumers who buy the add-on at
the high price ¯ p. The second term captures the proﬁt from sophisticated consumers
who rationally expect the add-on to be priced at Eˆ p = ¯ p and hence substitute away.
Again, we can use results from GL who show that unshrouding leads to lower
proﬁt if α > e
 p, which holds in our case as α > αz  e
 p. It thus again remains to be
shown that price discrimination does not increase proﬁt, either.
If all ﬁrms shroud, all naive consumers are uninformed unless they are misclassiﬁed
by ﬁrm i and erroneously get informed about the add-on. Hence, the proﬁt from price
30discrimination is equal to:
(p + ¯ p)αγD( p + p)
+ (p + e)α(1   γ)(1   λF)D( p + p)
+ (p + e)α(1   γ)λFD( p   e + p + e)
+ (p + e)(1   α)βD( p   e + p + e) (6)
+ p(1   α)(1   β)D( p   e + p + e)
=
(
p + αγ¯ p + e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β)
)
D( p + p).
The ﬁrst term of (6) captures the proﬁt ﬁrm i makes from naive consumers who are
classiﬁed correctly and hence pay the high add-on price ¯ p. The second and third term
capture the proﬁt from naive consumers who are misclassiﬁed (which happens with
ex-ante probability 1   γ). These consumers are oﬀered the low add-on price and
hence pay only e. A fraction (1   λF) of these consumers stays uninformed while a
fraction λF becomes informed. The fourth term captures the proﬁt from sophisticated
consumers who are classiﬁed correctly (which happens with ex-ante probability β).
The ﬁfth term captures the proﬁt from misclassiﬁed sophisticated consumers who
erroneously do not receive the low price oﬀer, therefore rationally expect that Eˆ p = ¯ p
and hence substitute away.
Comparing (5) and (6) reveals that shrouding yields strictly higher proﬁt than
price discrimination if and only if
α¯ p > αγ¯ p + e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β)
α¯ p > α(e   eγ   eβ + ¯ pγ) + βe
α(¯ p   e + eγ + eβ   ¯ pγ) > βe
α(eβ + (¯ p   e)(1   γ)) > βe
α >
βe
eβ + (¯ p   e)(1   γ)
α > α
z.
Thus, shrouding is an equilibrium.
31Case 3: Finally, suppose αy < α < αz. We show that price discrimination is an
equilibrium. Suppose all other ﬁrms engage in price discrimination. If ﬁrm i price
discriminates, as well, it makes proﬁt
(




equivalent to Equation (6).17
Alternatively, if ﬁrm i shrouds, proﬁt is equal to
(p + ¯ p)αγD( p + p)
+ (p + ¯ p)α(1   γ)(1   λF)D( p + p)
+ pα(1   γ)λFD( p   e + p + e) (8)
+ p(1   α)D( p   e + p + e)
=
(
p + ¯ pα(γ + (1   γ)(1   λF))
)
D( p + p).
The ﬁrst term of (8) captures the proﬁt ﬁrm i makes from uninformed naive consumers
who are classiﬁed correctly (by all other ﬁrms who price discriminate) and hence pay
the high add-on price ¯ p. The second and third term capture the proﬁt from naive
consumers who are misclassiﬁed (by all other ﬁrms who price discriminate). A fraction
(1   λF) of these consumers stays uninformed and also pays the high add-on price ¯ p
(second term). A fraction λF becomes informed and substitutes away (third term).
The fourth term captures the proﬁt from sophisticated consumers who substitute
away (or buy the low-priced add-on from a competitor).
Comparing (7) and (8) reveals that price discrimination yields strictly higher proﬁt
17We assume that all ﬁrms follow the same classiﬁcation of consumers.
32than shrouding if and only if
αγ¯ p + e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β) > ¯ pα(γ + (1   γ)(1   λF))
βe + α(γ¯ p + e   eγ   eβ) > α(¯ pγ + ¯ p(1   γ)(1   λF))
βe > α(¯ pγ + ¯ p(1   γ)(1   λF)   e + eγ + eβ   ¯ pγ))
βe > α(eβ + ¯ p(1   γ)(1   λF)   e(1   γ))
βe > α(eβ + (¯ p   ¯ pλF   e)(1   γ))
βe
eβ + (¯ p(1   λF)   e)(1   γ)
> α,








Furthermore, proﬁt from unshrouding is equal to
(p + e)D( p + p
) (9)
equivalent to Equation (3). Comparing (7) and (9) reveals that price discrimination
yields strictly higher proﬁt than unshrouding if and only if
αγ¯ p + e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β) > e
α(γ¯ p + e   eγ   eβ) > e   eβ
α >
e(1   β)
e(1   β) + (¯ p   e)γ
α > α
y.
Thus, price discrimination is an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Denote ˜ α := (1 λR)α the fraction of naive consumers
after regulatory intervention. The result follows from Proposition 1 replacing α by ˜ α.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider Table 1. In an unshrouded prices equilibrium,
all consumers buy the add-on; hence the welfare loss is zero. In a price discrimination
equilibrium, the fraction of sophisticated consumers who substitute away is equal to
33(1 β)(1 α). In a shrouded prices equilibrium, this fraction is equal to 1 α. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Sophisticated consumers either buy the add-on at price
e or exert substitution costs of the same amount. Thus, total costs of consumption
of sophisticated consumers depend on the price of the base good. Generally, if price
discrimination is possible, i.e., αy < e
 p < αz, the price of the base good equals
µ   αγ¯ p   e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β)
for αy < α < αz. If price discrimination is not possible, an unshrouded prices equi-
librium exists for αy < α < e
 p with a base good price equal to µ   e. Since α > αy,
the former price is lower than the latter price. Similarly, for e
 p < α < αz a shrouded
prices equilibrium exists if price discrimination is not possible. In this case, the base
good price equals µ   α¯ p. Again, since α < αz, the former price is lower than the
latter price. This proves the ﬁrst statement.
Next, consider prices of naive consumers. If price discrimination is not possible,
naive consumers pay a total price of µ e+e = µ in an unshrouded prices equilibrium
(α < e
 p) and a total price of µ α¯ p+¯ p = µ+(1 α)¯ p in a shrouded prices equilibrium
(e
 p < α). If price discrimination is possible (αy < α < αz), naive consumers who
are correctly classiﬁed (with probability γ) buy the add-on at pN = ¯ p, and naive
consumers who are misclassiﬁed (with probability 1   γ) buy the add-on at pS = e.
The expected total price for naive consumers is equal to
µ   αγ¯ p   e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β) + γ¯ p + (1   γ)e
= µ + (1   α)(γ¯ p + e(1   γ)   eβ).
Since e < ¯ p and β < 1, it immediately follows that this price is higher than µ (un-
shrouded prices equilibrium) but lower than µ+(1 α)¯ p (shrouded prices equilibrium).
This proves the second statement.
In a price discrimination equilibrium (αy < α < αz), naive consumers who are
34misclassiﬁed pay a total price
µ   αγ¯ p   e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β) + e
Since αy < α, this price is lower than µ (unshrouded prices equilibrium), and conse-
quently also lower than µ + (1   α)¯ p (shrouded prices equilibrium). This proves the
third statement.
Finally, in a price discrimination equilibrium (αy < α < αz), naive consumers that
are correctly classiﬁed pay a total price
µ   αγ¯ p   e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β) + ¯ p
= µ   αγ¯ p   eα(1   γ)   e(1   α)β + α¯ p + (1   α)¯ p
= µ + α(1   γ)(¯ p   e) + (1   α)(¯ p   eβ).
Since e < ¯ p and β < 1, it immediately follows that this price is higher than µ
(unshrouded prices equilibrium). Since α < αz, this price is lower than µ + (1   α)¯ p
(shrouded prices equilibrium). This proves the last statement. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider Table 1. If an unshrouded prices equilibrium
exists with and without regulatory intervention (α < αy), the welfare loss is always
zero. This proves the ﬁrst statement.
If ﬁrms are pushed from price discrimination to an unshrouded prices equilibrium
(αy < α < αx), the welfare loss falls from (1   β)(1   α)e to zero. This proves the
second statement.
The third statement summarizes the results for the remaining cases. If ﬁrms are
pushed from shrouded prices to price discrimination (αz < α < α♯), the welfare loss
changes from (1   α)e to (1   β)(1   (1   λR)α)e. Accordingly, the net eﬀect of
35regulatory intervention is positive if and only if
(1   α)e > (1   β)(1   (1   λR)α)e
(1   α)e > (1   (1   λR)α)e   β(1   (1   λR)α)e
0 > λRαe   β(1   (1   λR)α)e
β(1   (1   λR)α)e > λRαe
β >
λRα
1   (1   λR)α
.
Depending on β,λR and α, this condition may or may not hold. This proves the
fourth statement.
Finally, if a shrouded prices equilibrium exists without and with regulatory in-
tervention (α♯ < α), the welfare loss is (1   α)e and (1   (1   λR)α)e, respectively.
Thus, welfare decreases by λRαe through regulatory intervention. Similarly, if a price
discrimination equilibrium exists without and with regulatory intervention (αx < α <
αz), the welfare loss is equal to
(1 β)(1 α)e and (1 β)(1 (1 λR)α)e, respectively. Thus, welfare decreases by
(1   β)λRαe in this case. This proves the last statement. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: If an unshrouding equilibrium exists with and without
intervention (α < αy), all consumers face the same costs of consumption µ. Thus,
regulatory intervention has no eﬀect. This proves the ﬁrst statement.
In all other cases, expected consumer costs change through regulatory interven-
tion. Consider ﬁrst the sophisticated. Their costs of consumption solely depend on
the price of the base good, which is µ e in an unshrouded prices equilibrium, µ α¯ p
in a shrouded prices equilibrium, and
µ   αγ¯ p   e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β) = µ   α(γ¯ p + e(1   γ)   eβ)   eβ
in a price discrimination equilibrium (always before regulatory intervention). It can
easily be seen that, if regulatory intervention lowers the fraction of naive consumers
from α to (1 λR)α, the price of the base good in a price discrimination or shrouded
36prices equilibrium increases. Further, if ﬁrms are pushed from a shrouded prices to
a price discrimination equilibrium or from a price discrimination to an unshrouded
prices equilibrium, the price of the base good increases as well, since µ   α¯ p <
µ α(γ¯ p+e(1 γ) eβ) eβ if αz < α < α♯ and µ α(γ¯ p+e(1 γ) eβ) eβ < µ e
if αy < α < αx. Hence, consumption costs of sophisticated consumers always increase.
With regard to ex-ante naive consumers, consumption costs depend on whether a
naive consumer becomes informed through education (with probability λR) or remains
uninformed (with probability 1   λR). Consider ﬁrst ex-ante naive consumers who
remain uninformed. Just like the sophisticated, these consumers always pay a higher
base good price. Since they remain naive, their costs on the add-on are unchanged
except if ﬁrms are pushed from a shrouded prices to a price discrimination equilibrium.
In this case, they are misclassiﬁed with positive probability wich may lower their
consumption costs. In particular, their costs decrease if αz < α < α♯ and µ   α¯ p + ¯ p
is larger than
µ   (1   λR)αγ¯ p   e((1   λR)α(1   γ) + (1   (1   λR)α)β) + γ¯ p + (1   γ)e
= µ + (1   (1   λR)α)(γ¯ p + e(1   γ)   eβ),
which holds if λR is suﬃciently small (cf. the proof of Proposition 4).
Consider next the ex-ante naive consumers who become informed. These con-
sumers pay a higher based good price just as all other consumers, but always save on
the add-on. We consider all possible cases separately.
1) If ﬁrms are pushed from price discrimination to unshrouded prices (αy < α <
αx), consumption costs change from
µ   αγ¯ p   e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β) + γ¯ p + (1   γ)e
= µ + (1   α)(γ¯ p + e(1   γ)   eβ)
to µ, which constitutes a decline since e < ¯ p.
2) If a price discrimination equilibrium exists with and without intervention (αx <
37α < αz), costs change from
µ   αγ¯ p   e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β) + γ¯ p + (1   γ)e
to
µ   (1   λR)αγ¯ p   e((1   λR)α(1   γ) + (1   (1   λR)α)β) + e.
Thus, regulatory intervention decreases consumption costs, if and only if
µ   (1   λR)αγ¯ p   e((1   λR)α(1   γ) + (1   (1   λR)α)β) + e
< µ   αγ¯ p   e(α(1   γ) + (1   α)β) + γ¯ p + (1   γ)e
λRαγ¯ p + eλRα(1   γ)   eλRαβ + e < γ¯ p + (1   γ)e




(¯ p   e)γ
e(1   β) + (¯ p   e)γ
.
Since the right hand side is larger than one (which can easily be derived from the fact
that αx < 1), the condition is fulﬁlled for all α.
3) If ﬁrms are pushed from shrouded prices to price discrimination (αz < α < α♯),
costs change from µ + (1   α)¯ p to
µ   (1   λR)αγ¯ p   e((1   λR)α(1   γ) + (1   (1   λR)α)β) + e.
Thus, regulatory intervention decreases consumption costs, if and only if
µ   (1   λR)αγ¯ p   e((1   λR)α(1   γ) + (1   (1   λR)α)β) + e < µ + (1   α)¯ p
 (1   λR)αγ¯ p   e(1   λR)α(1   γ) + e(1   λR)αβ + α¯ p < ¯ p + eβ   e
α <
¯ p + eβ   e
¯ p + eβ   (γ¯ p + (1   γ)e   λR(e(1   β) + (¯ p   e)γ))
.
By the same argument as before the right hand side is larger than one, so the condition
is fulﬁlled for all α.
4) Finally, if a shrouded prices equilibrium exists with and without regulatory
intervention (α♯ < α), costs change from µ + (1   α)¯ p to µ   (1   λR)α¯ p + e. Thus,
38regulatory intervention decreases costs, if and only if
µ   (1   λR)α¯ p + e < µ + (1   α)¯ p










Again, the right hand side is larger than one, because α♯ < 1. Thus, costs decrease.
Q.E.D.
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